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Justice Douglas and the Equal Protection Clause
KENNETH L. KARST*
While egalitarianism is an American theme as old as the nation
itself, the principle of equality did not receive explicit recognition in
our constitutional text until 1868, when the fourteenth amendment be-
came law. Using a double-negative form of expression that continues to
plague us to this day, the framers of the amendment forbade any state
to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." This short provision has been the source of the most sig-
nificant constitutional development of our time, and Justice Douglas
has been the leader of that development.
The egalitarian ideal came naturally to a young man who had
grown up in modest circumstances in the far West in the early part of
the 20th century, and who had, by exceptional intellect and driving
energy, become a leading scholar in the most rarefied of academic envi-
ronments. As a teacher of the law of public utilities and corporate
finance, he was concerned about the abuses that can result from the
concentration of economic power; as Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, he had a chance to translate that concern into
government policy. It was no surprise that when Justice Brandeis re-
tired in 1939, he passed the word to President Roosevelt that he would
be pleased to be succeeded by William 0. Douglas. It is a compliment
to both men to say that Justice Douglas was a fitting successor to
Justice Brandeis.
Egalitarianism is one of those protean concepts that can be found
almost anywhere by an analyst who is looking for it. Yet it is fair to
say that the theme looms large in Justice Douglas' opinions over a
broad range of doctrinal areas. In antitrust law, he has consistently
supported governmental attacks on monopoly power.' He wrote many
of the Supreme Court's opinions laying to rest the doctrine of economic
due process and freeing government to act positively in the field of
social legislation.2 He was an important participant in the extension of
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the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to state criminal proceedings-thus
offering the Constitution's protections to those at the bottom of the
social-economic scale who are most frequently caught in the snares of
the criminal law.' An early critic of vagrancy laws," he wrote the
Court's opinion in the modern case that brought such laws within nar-
rowly circumscribed bounds.5 In that opinion, he remarked that the
people "generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance"
were "poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers," who were apt
to be the victims of discriminatory enforcement.6 And even Justice
Douglas' celebrated first amendment absolutism has been aimed mainly
at the protection of "nonconformists" and "dissenters." 7
The values of egalitarianism, then, can be defended in a great
many doctrinal contexts outside the equal protection clause. Yet it
was that clause which Justice Douglas used to achieve his most far-
reaching doctrinal results in the cause of equality. The clause was
originally designed primarily as a weapon against racial discrimination,
and it was.natural for Justice Douglas to read it for all it was worth
in bringing the Constitution to bear on this problem. In particular, he
pressed the Supreme Court to treat many kinds of "private" racial dis-
crimination as the functional equivalent of state action.8 While he
sometimes did not succeed in persuading a majority of the Court,' he
regularly infused judicial discussion of the state action issue with a
brand of realism that was refreshing--especially given the artificiality
of so many opinions in this doctrinal area. 0
It surely was Justice Douglas' vision of an egalitarian society that
led him to agonize over DeFunis v. Odegaard." (It is an accident of
history that he is, in the medical sense, color-blind. 2) In his view, an
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applicant to a state law school must have his or her application "con-
sidered on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner."' 3 One
may not share the position that race is irrelevant in such a context, and
yet understand how a Justice strongly dedicated to the egalitarian ideal
might balk at a racial preference whose aim is to equalize. The issue is
every bit as difficult as Justice Douglas saw it to be, and if he did not
resolve it, neither has the nation.
Justice Douglas' major doctrinal contribution to the growth of
equality was made in those areas of equal protection that extend be-
yond the guarantee of racial equality. As early as 1942, he laid the
doctrinal foundations for what came to be known, a generation later,
as "the new equal protection. '"" By the 1960's, he was able to lead a
majority of the Court in accepting the idea that government can consti-
tutionally discriminate against certain disadvantaged groups 5 or against
the enjoyment of certain fundamental interests 6 only upon a showing
of the kind of necessity implicit in the phrase "a compelling state in-
terest." Given the Court's retreat from the economic-liberty model of
substantive due process, and its lavish rhetoric about the evils of judi-
cial intervention to second-guess legislative choices, this doctrinal devel-
opment was striking. Of course Justice Douglas built on a rising his-
torical tide of egalitarianism; the point is that he did build.
There is irony in recognizing Justice Douglas' doctrinal leadership.
He is a Justice who is supposed to be so "result-oriented" as to care
nothing for the articulation of principle. But his legacy to us in the
equal protection area is precisely a legacy of doctrinal principle. True,
he often painted with a broad brush. When one wishes to stake out a
broad principle, that is quite appropriate, and may even be necessary.
As well as any other Justice of his time, Justice Douglas told us what
the factors were that caused him to decide as he did. That is surely
the most important test of a good opinion; if the opinion also can inte-
grate and consolidate doctrine, so much the better. But it is not easy
both to consolidate and to innovate in the same breath. Justice Douglas
was doctrinally innovative, and he usually17 explained the bases of his
innovations so that neither a lower court nor a legislator would have
difficulty understanding them. Constitutional growth demands such jus-
tices-perhaps not nine of them at a time, but certainly in some mini-
13416 U.S. at 337.
14 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
'- E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
16 E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
1
7 But see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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mum supply. For his egalitarian vision of America, and for the doctrinal
underpinnings he supplied to our era's egalitarian movements, we can
give thanks.
